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CHAPTER 6 
Damages for Personal Injury or Death 
JAMES W. SMITH 
§6.1. Introduction. This chapter has two purposes. Since the area 
of the law called "Damages" has not received separate treatment in 
past editions of the ANNUAL SURVEY OF MASSACHUSETIS LAW, it seemed 
desirable to discuss the major recent developments in Massachusetts 
in the personal injury damage area, which were not included in the 
Torts chapters of previous SURVEYS. Thus, such matters as the adop-
tion of the Uniform Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act, which were 
previously discussed,l are not repeated. 
Second, for some reason unknown to this author, damage problems 
which have become a matter of great controversy in other states have 
been virtually ignored in Massachusetts. Some of these problems are 
discussed in this chapter. 
§6.2. Benefits from collateral sources. Often an injured plaintiff, 
as a result of his injuries, will receive certain benefits from sources 
other than the defendant or the defendant's insurer. There are 
basically three types of benefits which a plaintiff may receive from 
such a collateral source: (a) continuation of wages during the period 
of disability; (b) proceeds received from health and accident insurance 
policies; (c) services rendered gratuitously. The question arises as to 
whether the defendant is entitled to have the plaintiff's damages re-
duced by the amount received from these collateral sources. 
(a) Wages. Wages received by the plaintiff during his disability, 
whether received as a matter of right under his employment contract 
or as a gratuity from his employer, are not deducted from the damages 
recoverable from the defendant for impairment of earning capacity.l 
This result occurs because recovery in Massachusetts is not for lost 
wages as such, but strictly for the impairment of earning capacity.2 A 
plaintiff's earning capacity may be impaired despite the fact that he 
has lost no wages. 
JAMFS W. SMITH is Professor of Law at Boston College Law School. He is a 
member of the Massachusetts Bar. 
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§6.1. 1 See 1962 Ann. Surv. Mass. Law §3.8. 
§6.2. 1 Shea v. Rettie, 287 Mass. 454, 192 N.E. 44 (1934). 
2 Doherty v. Ruiz, 302 Mass. 145, 18 N.E.2d 542 (1939). 
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There have been no recent cases in Massachusetts involving this 
rule. The only recent cases in the general area deal with the admis-
sibility of evidence of the receipt of wages by the plaintiff on the issue 
of malingering. In McElwain v. Capotosto,3 the Supreme Judicial 
Court held that such evidence was admissible in the discretion of the 
trial judge on the issue of whether the period of time of the plaintiff's 
absence from work was prolonged by the fact that he was being paid 
his wages without working and that the amount of such wages would 
not be deducted from his recoverable damages.4 
(b) Insurance proceeds. With respect to the receipt of proceeds from 
health and accident insurance policies, Massachusetts follows the rule 
of most states. The defendant is not entitled to benefit from the fact 
that the plaintiff has a health and accident insurance policy. Thus, 
despite the fact that it will result in a windfall to the plaintiff, the 
defendant is not entitled to have the proceeds received by the plaintiff 
from his insurance company deducted from the damages.5 There have 
been no recent cases in Massachusetts affecting this rule. 
(c) Services. It is difficult today to state with any degree of certainty 
the law of Massachusetts with respect to whether the plaintiff, in a 
personal injury case, may recover for the value of services which were 
rendered gratuitously by a friend or relative. In an early case, Copi-
thorne v. Hardy,6 the plaintiff, an adult, was allowed to recover the 
value of services rendered gratuitously by her mother. In a later de-
cision, Daniels v. Celeste,7 the Supreme Judicial Court refused to allow 
the plaintiff to recover the value of the services performed by his wife 
who was a registered nurse. The Court distinguished the Copithorne 
decision on the basis that the plaintiff could be legally bound to pay 
her mother for the reasonable value of the services, whereas the in-
ability of a husband and wife to contract with each other precluded 
the existence of such a legal obligation in the Daniels case. 
In 1963, the statutory provisions precluding the making of contracts 
between husband ,and wife were amended to allow such contracts.8 
Hence, if the sole reason for the result in the Daniels case was the 
inability of a husband and wife to contract with each other, then the 
law of Massachusetts today is that a plaintiff may recover from the 
3332 Mass. 1, 122 N.E.2d 901 (1954). 
4 In a recent United States Supreme Court decision, Eichel v. New York Cent. 
R.R., 375 U.S. 253 (1965), the Court held that the likelihood of misuse by the jury 
of such evidence outweighs its value on the issue of malingering and is therefore 
inadmissible. Hence, in a case being tried in a federal court, the source of the 
collateral benefit may be critical on the admissibility of this evidence. In a recent 
diversity case, Thompson v. Kawaski Kisen, K.K., 348 F.2d 879 (1st Cir. 1965), the 
court followed the Massachusetts rule set out in the McElwain dedsion, taking 
the position that since the payments were not made under a fedel,"al statute, the 
court was not bound by the rule set out in the Eichel decision. 
5 Gray v. Boston Elev. Ry., 215 Mass. 143, 146, 102 N.E. 71, 72 (1913). 
6173 Mass. 400, 53 N.E. 915 (1899). 
7303 Mass. 148,21 N.E.2d 1 (1939). 
8 See Acts of 1963, c. 765, amendingG.L., c. 209, §§2, 6, noted in 1963 Ann. Surv. 
Mass. Law §§4.6, 9.5. 
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defendant the reasonable value of services made necessary by the 
defendant's conduct, even though such services were, as a matter of 
fact, rendered gratuitously, irrespective of the personal relationship 
between the plaintiff and the person performing theservices.9 On the 
other hand, if the Daniels decision, taken as a whole, simply reflected 
an unwillingness by the Supreme Judicial Court to allow a plaintiff 
to recover damages for a medical expense which he never incurred, 
then the Court might well overrule Copithorne v. Hardy in some 
future decision.1o 
§6.3. Impairment of earning capacity. As mentioned in the pre-
vious section, the plaintiff in a personal injury action in Massachusetts 
does not recover for lost salary or wages as such; he recovers for the 
impairment of his earning capacity caused by the injury.l Apart from 
its effect on the operation of the collateral source rule discussed above,2 
this distinction has several ramifications. It allows a plaintiff to prove 
that the salary or wages being received by him at the time of the injury 
were not the true measure of his earning capacity, either present or 
future.3 This rule is particularly important to plaintiffs who at the 
9 A few exceptions to this statement may exist. For example, it seems unlikely 
that a person who receives gratuitous services from a charity or from a state or 
federal institution may be able to recover their value from the~defendant. When 
the plaintiff receives services from an infirmary operated by his employer, how-
ever, it could be argued that this situation is analogous to that in which one re-
ceives proceeds from a health insurance policy since the services may be considered 
part of the consideration he receives for his employment, and the plaintiff may be 
able to recover them as such. 
10 There are several reasons to believe that the Daniel decision may have simply 
reflected a dislike by the Court of the collateral source rule with respect to its 
application to gratuitous services. The distinction made by the Court with respect 
to contracts between husband and wife was overly technical. It was highly unlikely 
that the mother in the Copithorne case would maintain an action against her 
daughter for the value of her services. Furthermore, unless such services were per-
formed with the reasonable expectation of being paid for them, it is doubtful 
whether any legal obligation arose to pay for them. See Kirchgassner v. Rodick, 
170 Mass. 543, 49 N.E. 1015 (1898). Secondly, the Court in the Daniels case made 
no mention of the possibility of a moral obligation to pay for the services as 
being sufficient for the application of the collateral source rule despite the fact 
that such a theory has been held sufficient for its application in an earlier de-
cision. See Sibley v. Nason, 196 Mass. 125, 81 N.E. 887 (1907), involving a debt 
discharged in bankruptcy. See also Schwartz, The Collateral Source Rule, 41 B.U.L. 
Rev. 348, 355 (1961). Finally, the Court in the Daniel case distinguished the 
cases allowing recovery for impairment of earning capacity despite the fact that 
the plaintiff's salary was· continued during his disability, on the baSis that recovery 
in that situation is not for loss of salary but rather fOr the impairment of the 
capacity to earn. 303 Mass. at 151, 21 N.E.2d at 3. 
§6.3. 1 Doherty v. Ruiz, 302 Mass. 145, 18 N.E.2d 542 (1939). 
2 See §6.2 supra. 
3 In Mitchell v. Walton Lunch Co., 305 Mass. 76, 78, 25 N.E.2d 151, 153 (1940), 
the Supreme Judicial Court enumerated the elements relevant to the determinatiqn 
of damages for the impairment of earning capa~ity in the following language: "The 
determination of damages for the impairment of earning capacity is not susceptible 
to arithmetical calculation; its ascertainment must to a large degree depend upon 
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time of their injury had not yet reached an earning plateau in their 
field of endeavor. Furthermore, it allows a plaintiff to recover for im-
pairment of earning capacity even though he had never been gain-
fully employed or was unemployed at the time he received his injury.4 
This rule is particularly important in cases involving injuries to 
minors5 or housewives.6 
Only two cases involving the above rules were decided by the Su-
preme Judicial Court in recent years. In Thornton v. First National 
Stores, Inc.,7 the Supreme Judicial Court ordered a new trial confined 
to the issue of damages where the trial judge's instructions could have 
been interpreted by the jury as permitting a husband to recover con-
sequential damages for the impairment of his wife's earning capacity. 
The wife had died prior to the trial. Since the wife through her 
administrator was entitled to recover for impairment of her earning 
capacity, allowing the husband to recover in his own right for such 
impairment would have resulted in a double recovery.8 
In Kane v. Fields Corner Grille Inc.,9 the Supreme Judicial Court 
reiterated the rule established in earlier caseslO that while recovery is 
for impairment of earning capacity and not for wages as such, wages 
earned prior to the injury are admissible as proof of earning capacity 
of the plaintiff. 
Two of the most intriguing problems which have arisen in recent 
years with respect to the recovery of damages for impairment of earn-
ing capacity are: (1) whether the defendant is entitled to have the 
jury instructed that since tort awards are not subject to federal tax,11 
earning capacity should be calculated on the basis of net earnings 
after taxes rather than on the basis of gross earnings;12 and (2) whether 
the practical sagacity, common knowledge and good sense of the jury in considering 
the age, skill, training, experience and industry of the plaintiff, the extent of his 
physical injury, the wages commonly received by one pursuing a similar occupation 
in the vicinity of the plaintiff's employment and whatever other evidence is intro-
duced to aid them in arriving at a just conclusion." 
4 Cushman v. Boston, W. & N.Y. St. Ry., 319 Mass. 177, 65 N.E.2d 6 (1946); Koch 
v. Lynch, 247 Mass. 459, 141 N.E. 677 (1924). 
5 In Massachusetts a minor can recover for the impairment of his earning capacity 
only from the time he reaches his majority. During minority, the minor's father 
has an action for loss of services. See Zarba v. Lane, 322 Mass. 132, 76 N.E.2d 318 
(1947). 
6 Matloff v. City of Chelsea, 308 Mass. 134, 31 N.E.2d 518 (1941). Since a house-
wife may recover for the impairment of her earning capacity, the husband of the 
injured housewife may not recover as consequential damages the amount paid by 
him for the services of a housekeeper during his wife's period of disability. Alden 
v. Norwood Arena, 332 Mass. 267, 124 N.E.2d 505 (1955); Rodgers v. Boynton, 315 
Mass. 279, 52 N.E.2d 576 (1943). 
7340 Mass. 222, 163 N.E.2d 264 (1960). 
8 See note 6 supra. 
9341 Mass. 640, 171 N.E.2d 287 (1961). 
10 See Doherty v. Ruiz, 302 Mass. 145, 18 N.E.2d 542 (1939); Braithwaite v. Hall, 
168 Mass. 38, 46 N.E. 398 (1897). 
11 Internal Revenue Code of 1954, §104. 
12 One of the most complete discussions of this question is contained in the opin-
ions in McWeeney v. New York, N.H. & H. R.R., 282 F.2d 34 (2d Cir. 1960), cert. 
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the plaintiff is entitled to have the jury instructed that it may con-
sider the decreasing value of the dollar in assessing damages for 
future impairment of earning capacity.13 While many other jurisdic-
tions have dealt with these problems the Supreme Judicial Court has 
not as yet been called upon to decide these questions. 
Most jurisdictions which have considered the first question have 
taken the position that in computing the plaintiff's earning capacity 
no consideration should be given to the matter of federal taxation.14 
The reasons given for this position are: (1) uncertainties as to the 
plaintiff's future tax liability render such considerations too con-
jectural (e.g., number of exemptions, use of joint return, possible 
change in tax rates); (2) introduction of such matters would greatly 
complicate the trial of the case; (3) such matters as inflation and at-
torney's fees tend to offset any financial advantage received by the 
plaintiff; (4) by exempting such awards from federal taxation Congress 
intended that the victim and not the wrongdoer receive the tax 
benefit. 
With respect to the second question most courts have held that the 
matter of inflation or deflation is a proper consideration for the jury 
in arriving at an award for personal injury.15 
§6.4. Medical expenses. In Massachusetts, damages are recover-
able for medical expenses both past and future.1 For convenience in 
presentation we shall first deal with the problems of medical expenses 
up to the date of the trial and then discuss the problems involved in 
future medical expenses. 
(a) Past medical expenses. The plaintiff in a personal injury case 
may recover the reasonable expenses incurred by him for medical care 
and nursing in the treatment and cure of his injury.2 While such 
medical services must have been necessary to alleviate the injury, the 
test of necessity is not whether the services were in fact necessary but 
whether they were reasonable, in the light of facts known at the time 
they were rendered.3 
denied, 364 U.S. 870 (1960). See Feldman, Injury Awards: Should Tax-Exempt Be 
Ignored? 7 Ariz. L. Rev. 272 (1966). See Annot., 63 A.L.R.2d 1393 (1959). 
13 See Annot., 12 A.L.R.2d 611, 636-642 (1950). 
14 See note 12 supra. 
15 See note 13 supra. 
§6.4. 1 Cassidy v. Constantine, 269 Mass. 56, 168 N.E. 169 (1929). 
2 Rodgers v. Boynton, 315 Mass. 279, 52 N.E.2d 576 (1943). 
3 In Hunt v. Boston Terminal Co., 212 Mass. 99, 101, 98 N.E. 786, 786 (1912), the 
Court defined the rule as follows: "If the appearance of the patient's body resulting 
from the defendant's wrong, together with an honest and fair statement of his feel-
ings and sensations, are such as sometimes in common experience might cause an 
attending physician, selected in the exercise of reasonable prudence in view of the 
seriousness of the injury, to believe that a certain physical condition existed, and to 
give treatment in accordance with that belief, then the defendant will be respon-
sible even though subsequent developments may demonstrate that the supposed 
physical condition in fact did not exist, and would not have been supposed to exist 
by a physician more skillful, experienced or highly trained, and even though the 
injury may be aggravated by the treatment in fact given." 
5
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When a married woman or a minor brings an action for personal 
injuries, the husband of such woman or a parent or guardian ·0£ such 
minor, if he has paid or incurred medical expenses because of such 
injuries, may, upon motion, be admitted as a party plaintiff for the 
recovery of such medical expenses.4 Of course, in this situation the 
action for these consequential damages stands no better than the prin-
cipal case and falls if the latter falls.5 
As mentioned previously, recovery of medical expenses is limited 
to those expenses which are reasonable.6 Difficulties have arisen in 
many jurisdictions as to how reasonableness is proven. Perhaps the 
most significant development in Massachusetts in recent years in the 
area of medical expenses was the enactment of General Laws, Chapter 
233, Section 79G.7 This section provides that, in an action for personal 
injury or for consequential damages arising therefrom, an itemized bill 
sworn to by the physician, dentist or authorized agent of the hospital 
rendering services shall be admissible as evidence of the fair and rea-
. sonable charge for such services. Written notice of the intention to 
offer such a bill as such evidence together with a copy of the bill must 
be given to the opposing party or his attorney not less than ten days 
before trial. The statute does not limit the right of the defendant to 
stimmon the witness at his own expense for the purpose of cross exam-
ination with respect to such bill or to rebut the contents thereof or 
for any other purpose or to adduce other testimony regarding the bill. 
(b) Future medical expenses. The plaintiff in a personal injury ac-
tion is entitled to recover damages for proven future probable medical 
expenses.s Unlike the situation involving recovery for past medical 
expenses a husband may not recover for the future medical expeIlses 
likely to be incurred as a result of injury to his wife.9 Such recovery 
belongs to the wife alone.10 The reaSOIl for this rule is that if the 
husband recovered the damages for future medical expenses, there 
would be no assurance that he would use the money for such purpose. 
He would not hold it in trust. It would be part of his estate at his 
<leath. He coulq, squander .it. As was pointed out by the Supreme Ju-
dicial Court in' Cassidy v. Constantine: ll "It is, however,common 
knowledge that divorces are . frequent, that husbands occasionally 
squander their substance and sometimes desert their wives and other-
wise fail in the performance of their full conjugal duties." 
4 C.L., c. 231, §6A. Hit appears that the wife, rather than the husband, has paid 
her medical expenses'.or has rendered herself liable for such expenses,she may re-
cover for them,in her own action. Thibeault v. Poole, 283 Mass. 480, 186 N.E. 632 
(1933). 
513r,azinskos y. kS: Fawcett, Inc., 318 Mass. 263, 61 N.E.2d 105 (1945). 
6 Rodgers v. BoyntoIj., 315 Mass. 279, 52 N.E.2d 576 (1943). 
7 Acts of 1958, c. 323. 
S Cassidy v, Constantine, 269 Mass. 56, 168 N.E.169 (1929). 
9Id. 
10 Rodgers v. Boyn~on, 315 Mass. 279,52 N.E.2d 576 (1943) . 
. 11269 Mass. at 59,168 N.E. at 170(1929). 
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An interesting question which has not yet been presented to the 
Supreme Judicial Court is whether the rationale of the Cassidy case 
would be equally applicable in the situation involving recovery for 
future medical expenses of a minor. If such expenses are recoverable 
as consequential damages by a parent of the injured minor, they would 
become part of that parent's estate at his death, available for payment 
of his debts, and thus might never be used to provide the needed 
medical services for the minor. Or, as mentioned in the Cassidy case 
with respect to a husband, a parent might squander the money or 
desert his family. A majority of the jurisdictions which have con-
sidered this problem have held that for the protection of the minor, 
future medical expenses should be recoverable in the action brought 
on the minor's behalf, rather than in an action by the parent on his 
own behalf.12 
§6.5. Pain and suffering. Although not an out-of-pocket expense, 
the successful plaintiff in a personal injury case is entitled to recover 
damages for his pain and suffering.1 Recovery will be allowed both 
for past pain and suffering and for such pain and suffering as is shown 
to be reasonably probable to continue in the future.2 
(a) Past pain and suffering. Many of the cases dealing with past pain 
and suffering involve situations where the victim died subsequent to 
his injuries, but before suit was brought. While a substantial recovery 
may be had in such situations, even for a very brief period of pain 
and suffering,3 the plaintiff has the burden of proving that the dece-
dent was conscious for some period of time following the injury.4 Most 
12 See Annot., 32 A.L.R.2d 1060, 1075 (1953, Supp. 1963). For a case accepting the 
minority view, see Peer v. City of Newark, 71 N.J. Super. 12, 176 A.2d 249 (1961), 
holding that the parent is entitled to recover future medical expenses for care of 
the minor, including expenses incurred after the infant reaches majority. 
As mentioned in the text, there is no Massachusetts decision directly on point. 
There is, however, language in one Massachusetts opinion which could be inter-
preted as meaning that the parent in his own right could recover the future medical 
expenses when a minor is injured. In the case of Rodgers v. Boynton, 315 Mass. 279, 
280-281, 52 N.E.2d 576, 577 (1946), the Court stated: "The amount of compensation 
that a wrongdoer is required to pay does not depend upon the fact that the victim 
is a minor or a married woman. In such instances, the law splits the cause of action 
arising from the personal injury to the minor or married woman and gives each 
the right to recover for personal injuries, and gives the parent or husband, as the 
case may be, the right to recover for medical and nursing expenses, but in the case 
of the husband only for such expenses up to the time of trial." (Emphasis added.) 
§6.5. 1 Rodgers v. Boynton, 315 Mass. 279, 52 N.E.2d (1943). 
2 In Pullen v. Boston Elev. Ry., 208 Mass. 356, 94 N.E. 469 (1911), the Supreme 
Judicial Court pointed out that a possibility that suffering will occur in the future 
is insufficient to allow recovery. 
3 In Toczko v. Armentano, 341 Mass. 474, 170 N.E.2d 703 (1960), the Supreme 
Judicial Court refused to interfere with a verdict of $7500 for approximately 
eighty-five minutes of conscious SUffering. 
4 In Royal Indemnity Co. v. Pittsfield Elec. Co., 293 Mass. 4, 199 N.E. 69 (1935), 
the Court held that a finding that the decedent, who was killed by a severe electric 
shock, suffered consciously after the shock was not warranted on evidence that he 
emitted a "scream" or "two cries" about a second apart. 
7
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of the recent Massachusetts cases in this area have involved the ques-
tion of whether the plaintiff's evidence was sufficient to warrant a find-
ing of consciousness on the part of the decedent. 
Evidence admissible on the issue of consciousness may involve state-
ments by the decedent prior to death,!' exclamations,s groans,7 various 
movements of the body such as the squeezing of a hand,s response by 
the victim to the calling of his name,9 response by the victim to a 
stimulus such as a pinpricklO or simply the nature of the injury and 
the manner in which death occurred.ll If there is one point, however, 
which recent cases emphasize, it is the importance of expert medical 
testimony in a close case. This is best illustrated by comparing two 
Massachusetts decisions, Alden v. Norwood Arena, Inc.12 and Carr v. 
Arthur D. Little, Inc.13 
In the Alden case, the decedent was struck by a wheel which flew 
from a stock car while she was watching a stock car race with her 
husband. She died two days later from the injuries she received. Dur-
ing this two-day period her husband, a physician, was constantly at her 
side. At the trial he testified that on four occasions the decedent 
squeezed his hand in response to short phrases which he whispered 
in her ear. He also testified that she squirmed in response to a pin-
prick although he conceded that a person could withdraw from a 
pinprick involuntarily. When asked what he saw that would indicate 
his wife was suffering, the husband said that he observed the expression 
on her face, the way she was breathing, the color of her skin and her 
movements, such as they were. On this evidence the Supreme Judicial 
Court held that a jury could find conscious suffering. While admitting 
that it was a close case, the Court stated that considering the fact that 
the decedent's husband was a physician of many years experience, his 
Ii Hayes v. Pitts-Kimball Co., 183 Mass. 262. 67 N.E. 249 (1903). 
6 In a 1965 case, Baldassare v. Crown Furniture Co., Inc., 349 Mass. 183. 207 
N.E.2d 268, the victim was killed by bricks from a falling bUilding. The Court held 
that exclamations uttered by the decedent were insufficient to warrant a finding of 
conscious suffering where the evidence failed to disclose that such exclamations 
were uttered subsequent to the victim being struck by the falling bricks. 
7 Nadeau v. Inhabitants of Taunton, 247 Mass. 104, 141 N.E. 608 (1923). 
8 Alden v. Norwood Arena, Inc., 332 Mass. 267. 124 N.E.2d 505 (1955). In Markell 
v. Gahn, 343 Mass. 468, 179 N.E.2d 587 (1962), the victim apparently attempted to 
prevent a nurse from removing his wallet by rolling over and using his left hand. 
In Ghiz v. Wantman, 337 Mass. 415, 149 N.E.2d 595 (1958), the Court held the 
evidence that the victim moaned, moved his head and tried to raise it, and mumbled 
some incomprehensible words before he died was insufficient to warrant a finding 
of conscious suffering. 
9 Carr v. Arthur D. Little. Inc., 348 Mass. 469, 204 N.E.2d 466 (1965). 
10 Alden v. Norwood Arena, Inc., 332 Mass. 267. 124 N.E.2d 505 (1955). 
11 In Campbell v. Romanos, 346 Mass. 361, 191 N.E.2d 764 (1963), evidence that 
the victim came in contact with a fire that burned her hair and that she ran away 
from the flames back into her apartment and later was found dead there was held 
sufficient to warrant a finding of conscious suffering. 
12 332 Mass. 267, 124 N.E.2d 505 (1955). 
13348 Mass. 469. 204 N.E.2d 466 (1965). 
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testimony as to the significance of his wife's appearance and behavior 
was enough to warrant the judge to submit the case to the jury.14 
In the Carr case the decedent received a severe head injury. The evi-
dence presented by the plaintiff on the issue of consciousness was that 
the decedent, during the ten-minute ambulance trip to the hospital, 
moaned and groaned every half minute or so. His hands were opening 
and clenching. During the two-day period prior to his death, the dece-
dent's wife, a registered nurse, was with him. On three occasions she 
ran her finger down the sole of her husband's foot and his toes moved. 
On one occasion she called his name several times and he moved his 
head very slightly toward her and moved his hand with his fingers 
toward her. A qualified neurologist, called by the defendant, was the 
only medical witness in the case. He testified that the movements of 
the decedent were not necessarily indicative of consciousness and that 
it was his opinion that the decedent was never conscious following the 
accident. The Court held that the evidence of conscious action was at 
most speculative and did not meet the burden of proof which is upon 
the plaintiff.15 
A comparison of the Alden and Carr cases demonstrates that apart 
from the medical testimony in the cases, the evidence presented by the 
plaintiff in each case is almost identical. In each case there was a 
severe head injury, a two-day interval from injury to death during 
which the victim moaned and groaned, physical response to a stimulus 
and an apparent response to words uttered by the victim's spouse. The 
difference between the two cases was that in the Alden case the victim's 
husband was a physician who testified that in his opinion his wife 
experienced conscious pain whereas in the Carr case the only medical 
testimony was presented by the defendant. 
The opinion in the Carr case provides an excellent review of the 
Massachusetts cases on the issue of consciousness and its summary of 
these cases highlights the importance of medical testimony: 
The foregoing review of our cases on this subject leads to the 
conclusion that they may be classified in three categories. 1. Cases 
wherein the sounds, movements, or both, of the decedent are in-
sufficient in the light of common experience and present medical 
knowledge to warrant a finding of conscious suffering. 2. Cases 
wherein the acts, utterances or both are sufficient in the light of 
common experience to warrant a finding of conscious suffering 
regardless of expert medical testimony. 3. Cases wherein the 
sounds, movements, or both, are insufficient to warrant laymen 
finding conscious suffering, but which when supported by inter-
pretive expert medical testimony could warrant a finding of con-
scious suffering.16 
(b) Future pain and suffering. As mentioned previously, the success-
14 332 Mass. at 274, 124 N.E.2d at 509 (1955). 
15348 Mass. at 478, 204 N.E.2d at 471 (1965). 
16Id. at 477,204 N.E.2d at 471. 
9
Smith: Chapter 6: Damages for Personal Injury or Death
Published by Digital Commons @ Boston College Law School, 1967
82 1967 ANNUAL SURVEY· OF MASSACHUSETIS LAW §6.5 
ful plaintiff in a personal injury action is entitled to recover damages 
for such pain and suffering as is likely to occur in the future. The 
major legal question today in the area of future pain and suffering is 
whether counsel, in argument to the jury, may use a mathematical 
formula by stating that specific sums per day, hour or minute may be 
allowed as damages for pain and suffering. This argument based upon 
a unit-of-time measurement of pain and suffering is generally referred 
to as a "per-diem argument." 
The principal reasons advanced in favor of the per-diem argument 
are that since translating pain and suffering into dollars can, at best, 
be an arbitrary determination, the per-diem argument is an aid to the 
jury, will not mislead them, and is a logical method to clarify the 
difficult problem of granting a total verdict.17 The principal objection 
to the per-diem argument is that it is misleading. A small sum multi-
plied by the number of hours in the plaintiff's life expectancy intro-
duces an element of apparent precision that is illusory and compounds 
the dangers of conjecture.1S While there are approximately ten juris-
dictions which have rejected the use of the per-diem argument,19 a 
majority of the jurisdictions which have considered the matter have 
allowed it. In a case decided during the 1967 SURVEY year, Cuddy v. L. 
and M. Equipment Co.,2f1 the Supreme Judicial Court declined the 
opportunity to state its position on the matter. In the Cuddy case, the 
defendant maintained that the plaintiff's reference to possible per-diem 
sums upon which the jury could calculate damages for pain and suffer-
ing was prejudicia1.21 In refusing to pass upon the validity of the 
per-diem argument the Court pointed out that whatever dangers such 
a line of argument may be thought to present, those dangers were 
adequately forestalled by the judge's charge to the jury.22 
Whether one agrees or disagrees with the validity of the per-diem 
argument, it is unlikely that a trial judge's charge could neutralize 
the prejudicial effect of the per-diem argument. Since a jury will ordi-
narily have difficulty in arriving at a figure for future pain and suffer-
ing, the per-diem approach, once suggested to them, will appear to be 
the only definite standard given to them in the course of the trial; 
17 See Yates v. Wenk, 363 Mich. 311, 109 N.W.2d 828 (1961); Ratner v. Arrington, 
111 So. 2d 82 (Fla. App. 1959). 
IS See Duguay v. Gelinas, 104 N.H. 182, 182 A.2d 451 (1962); Botta v. Brunner, 
26 N.J. 82, 138 A.2d 713, 60 A.L.R.2d 1331 (1958). 
19 See Duguay v. Gelinas, 104 N.H. 182, 184-185, 182 A.2d 451, 453 (1962). 
20 1967 Mass. Adv. Sh. 751, 225 N.E.2d 904. 
21Id. at 755, 225 N.E.2d at 908. 
22Id. at 756 n.4, 225 N.E.2d at 908 n.4. The relevant portion of the charge read 
as follows: "There is no formula by which we determine damages if you come to 
that phase of it; and the only method by which you determine damages is to exer-
cise your good common sense and your reason, as far as evidence is concerned, in 
relation to the injuries and the circumstances that bear upon the matter of injuries 
received as claimed, and the determination whether they have been substantiated. 
I would also like to say that the determination of dollars and cents is determined 
by the exercise of common sense." 
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much more definite than common sense and reason. Since the validity 
of the per-diem argument is basically a matter of procedure, which will 
no doubt arise in many future cases, it is not clear why the Supreme 
Judicial Court refused to take a position on it. Perhaps the Court 
preferred to await a case where the damages appeared to be clearly 
excessive before commenting on its validity. 
§6.6. Wrongful death. As in all other states, the right of action for 
wrongful death in Massachusetts is statutory.1 Unlike the law of most 
states, however, the damages recoverable by the survivors of the dece-
dent in Massachusetts are measured by the degree of culpability of the 
defendant's conduct rather than by the loss sustained by the survivors.2 
While this standard avoids some difficult damage problems, such as 
ascertaining the pecuniary loss sustained by parents resulting from the 
death of their infant,3 the inequities of this standard seem to clearly 
outweigh the benefits resulting from its simplicity of application. In 
fact, one of the most significant developments in recent years with 
respect to the Massachusetts wrongful death statute has been the re-
fusal on the part of other jurisdictions to apply it with respect to 
accidents occurring in Massachusetts.4 
The fact that the Massachusetts wrongful death statute is penal in 
nature has some rather interesting ramifications, many of which have 
been highlighted by recent decisions. 
(a) Releases. The law of most jurisdictions is that a wrongful death 
action cannot be maintained where the decedent, prior to his death, 
executed a release with respect to his injuries.5 The reasons for this 
rule range from a literal reading of the applicable wrongful death 
statute to the fact that allowance of the action could result in a double 
recovery to the survivors and operate to discourage the settlement of 
claims in serious personal injury cases.6 In Wall v. Massachusetts 
§6.6. 1 C.L., c. 229. 
2 Massachusetts is one of only two states which uses a culpability standard in 
assessing damages for wrongful death. See C.L., c. 229, §2. The other state is 
Alabama. See Ala. Code, tit. 7, §123 (1953). 
3 For a discussion of the difficulties involved in calculating compensatory damages 
for the wrongful death of an infant, see Wycko v. Cnodtke, 361 Mich. 331, 105 
N.W.2d ll8 (1960). 
4 See Kilberg v. Northeast Airline, Inc., 9 N.Y.2d 34, 172 N.E.2d 526 (1961), 
wherein the New York Court of Appeals refused to apply the limits on recovery set 
out in the Massachusetts death statute with respect to a recovery for an accident 
which occurred in Massachusetts causing death to a New York resident. A subse-
quent case, Pearson v. Northeast Airlines, Inc., 199 F. Supp. 539 (S.D.N.Y. 1961), 
aU'd, 309 F.2d 553 (2d Cir. 1962), a diversity action arising from the same accident, 
went further than the Kilberg case. It held that not only the limits on recovery but 
the penal standard of the Massachusetts death statute was inapplicable. See 1963 
Ann. Surv. Mass. Law §8.I. See also §7.1 infra. 
5 See Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Cassin, III Ca. 575, 36 S.E. 881 (1900), for 
the principal case denying recovery. See also Moaney v. City of Chicago, 239 Ill. 
414, 88 N.E. 194 (1909); Strode v. St. Louis Transit Co., 197 Mo. 616, 95 S.W. 851 
(1906). The principal case contra is Rowe v. Richards, 35 S.D. 201, 151 N.W. 1001 
(1915). See also Hugh Breeding, Inc. v. Daniel, 373 P.2d 75 (Okla. 1962). 
6 See Dibble v. New York & Erie R.R., 25 N.Y. 183 (1857). 
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Northeastern Street Ry.,7 the Supreme Judicial Court held that such a 
release did not bar recovery under the Massachusetts statute, prin-
cipally because recovery under the Massachusetts statute is a penalty 
imposed for bringing about the decedent's death. It is a cause of action 
over which the deceased had no control during his lifetime and hence 
could not affect by his release.8 The Wall case had an interesting ap-
plication in a recent decision of the United States Court of Appeals, 
Montellier v. United States,9 involving the Federal Tort Claims Act. 
In the Montellier case, the decedent was killed in Massachusetts 
through the negligence of agents of the United States government. 
The decedent's administratrix brought a death action against the 
United States under the Federal Tort Claims Act and recovered 
$168,000. This amount greatly exceeded the maximum recovery allow-
able under the Massachusetts death statute.10 This point was, how-
ever, not contested by the Government because it had been held in an 
earlier United States Supreme Court decision, Massachusetts Bonding 
and Insurance Co. v. United States,H that since punitive damages can-
not be awarded under the Federal Tort Claims Act, the punitive aspect 
of the Massachusetts death statute could not be applied against the 
United States. However, rather than denying recovery on this basis, the 
United States Supreme Court held that the Massachusetts death statute 
could be used to determine the existence of liability, but compensatory 
damages would be substituted for punitive damages, and since the maxi-
mum recovery provision in the Massachusetts death statute was as-
sociated with the punitive concept of the statute it would not be 
applied.12 
In the Montellier case, the decedent had executed a release of all 
claims. The Government, while conceding that such a release under the 
Wall case did not bar a subsequent wrongful death action, argued that 
since the rationale of the Wall case was based upon the penal nature 
of the Massachusetts death statute, it had no application in the present 
case where, due to the Massachusetts Bonding and Insurance Co. de-
cision, the damages recoverable against the United States government 
were compensatory in nature. The Court of Appeals rejected this argu-
ment, holding that since the effectiveness of the release goes to the exis-
tence of liability of the United States, it is immaterial that the Massa-
chusetts rule as established in the Wall case stems from the penal 
nature of the Massachusetts death statute. Since the release would be 
ineffective to bar a death action under Massachusetts law, it was there-
fore ineffective in a death action brought under the Federal Tort 
Claims Act as the result of an accident occurring in Massachusetts. 
7229 Mass. 506, 118 N.E. 864 (1918). 
8Id. at 507, 118 N.E. at 864. 
II 315 F.2d 180, 184·185 (2d Cir. 1963). 
10 The maximum recovery now under the Massachusetts death statute is $50,000. 
G.L., c. 229, §2. 
11352 U.S. 128 (1956). 
12Id. at 133. 
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(b) Joint tortfeasors. If a plaintiff has been injured by the conduct 
of joint tortfeasors, while he may obtain a judgment for the full 
amount of his loss against each tortfeasor, he obviously is not entitled 
to have his judgment satisfied twice,13 On the other hand, when a 
person is killed by the wrongful conduct of several tortfeasors, the 
damages recoverable against each of the tortfeasors under the Massa-
chusetts death statute are assessed separately and any amount paid by 
one of the tortfeasors has no effect on the amount paid by the other.14 
In fact, in death cases, no single action against joint wrongdoers can 
be maintained,15 This result is based on the premise that since the 
Massachusetts death statute is penal in nature, logically, "as in the 
criminal law, each wrongdoer may be made to suffer the maximum 
penalty, no matter how many are guilty."16 This reasoning applies 
even though the total amount recovered against all of the tortfeasors 
exceeds the $50,000 maximum set out in the death statute.17 Where, 
however, there is more than one defendant solely because of the ap-
plication of the doctrine of vicarious responsibility, such as respondeat 
superior, the plaintiff is limited in the amount he can recover from 
all the tortfeasors to the statutory limit of $50,000. In such instance, 
while judgments may be rendered in single actions against the master 
and the servant, and the plaintiff may pursue both master and servant 
until satisfaction is obtained, the plaintiff cannot collect fully on both 
judgments.18 
The recent decision of Baldassare v. Crown Furniture Co., Inc.,19 
presented a unique application of this problem. In Baldassare the 
decedent was killed when a building collapsed on him. The building 
was owned by Dora Fagelman and was leased by Crown Furniture Co., 
Inc. The collapse of the building was primarily due to the negligence 
of the agents of Crown in removing certain jacks which were support-
ing the building. These agents were Dora's husband, son and son-in-
law. In the trial court a judgment was rendered against Dora as the 
owner and one in control of the premises for $16,000, and a judgment 
was rendered against Crown for $18,000. On appeal, the Supreme 
13 Sacchetti v. Springer, 303 Mass. 480, 22 N.E.2d 42 (1939). 
14 Arnold v. Jacobs, 316 Mass. 81, 54 N.E.2d 922 (1944). Actions against each de-
fendant are separate. Brown v. Thayer, 212 Mass. 392, 99 N.E. 237 (1912); D'Almeida 
v. Boston & Maine R.R., 209 Mass. 81, 95 N.E. 398 (1911). The plaintiff's handling 
and the disposition of one is totally immaterial to the others. Whalen v. Shivek, 
326 Mass. 142, 93 N.E.2d 393 (1950); Edgarton v. H.P. Welch Co., 321 Mass. 603, 74 
N.E.2d 674 (1947); Nugent v. Boston Consol. Gas Co., 238 Mass. 221, 120 N.E. 488 
(1921). 
15 Gordon v. Cross & Roberts, Inc., 287 Mass. 362, 191 N.E. 407 (1934). 
16 Arnold v. Jacobs, 316 Mass. 81, 84, 54 N.E.2d 922, 923 (1944). 
17 "The statute, following a pattern familiar in criminal and penal provisions, 
limits the penalty that can be imposed upon one person for causing one death. It 
does not limit the amount that can be collected from a number of wrongdoers for 
one death." Id. 
18 Leonard v. Lumbermans Mutual Cas. Co., 298 Mass. 393, 10 N.E.2d 469 (1937); 
Gordon v. Cross & Roberts, Inc., 287 Mass. 362, 191 N.E. 407 (1934). 
19349 Mass. 183, 207 N.E.2d 268 (1965). 
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Judicial Court held that, while the evidence permitted recovery against 
Dora for failure to take adequate precautions to protect the public, 
there was nothing in the evidence to suggest that she acted or omitted 
to act otherwise, with respect to the building, than through the same 
persons who acted more immediately for Crown. The Court thus con-
cluded that a maximum of $18,000 could be recovered against Crown 
and a maximum of $16,000 could be recovered against Dora, but any 
amount collected from Dora must be credited against Crown's liability 
and any amount collected from Crown must be credited against Dora's 
liability. 
The result reached in the Baldassare case appears correct. Dora, 
while the owner of record of the building, seems to be nothing more 
than a straw for Crown. The result, however, does have one incon-
sistency. If, as the Court stated, the same acts or omissions imputed to 
Crown and to Dora, without independent activity or participation by 
her, are the basis of the recovery against Crown and against Dora,20 
then the amount of the judgment against Dora should have been the 
same as the amount against Crown. Obviously the conduct of the 
agents of Crown was not less culpable when imputed to Dora than 
when imputed to Crown. 
(c) Death of a child. The only situation where the Massachusetts 
wrongful death statute brings about a result which is more sensible 
than that reached in jurisdictions having a compensatory type of 
statue is where the death of a child is involved. Most Lord Campbell-
type death statutes have been interpreted as allowing recovery only for 
losses which are pecuniary in nature. While the pecuniary loss theory 
has generally been interpreted to encompass loss of consortium on the 
death of a spouse or loss of guidance on the death of a parent, it has 
not generally been stretched to include damages for grief. 
When the pecuniary loss theory first came into existence21 it could 
be logically applied to the death of a child. A healthy child was at 
that time an economic asset. While certain types of child-labor laws 
were coming into existence, most children over the age of ten years 
were working and contributing their meager earnings to the family. 
Today, most children are economic liabilities. Therefore, in most in-
stances, recovery for the death of a child under the usual type of death 
statute has become a game of "make-believe." Recovery for grief is 
being allowed under the guise of a pecuniary loss.22 
20 Id. at 194-95, 207 N.E.2d at 275-276. 
21 The pecuniary loss theory was first advanced in Blake v. Midland Ry., llS Eng. 
Rep. 35 (Q.B. IS52). 
22 A few jurisdictions have expressly rejected the view that recovery for the death 
of a child must be based upon the potential earning capacity of the child during 
minority. Thus, in Wycko v. Gnodtke, 361 Mich. 331, 105 N.W.2d llS (1960), the 
court held recovery may be had for the pecuniary value of the child's life which 
includes the expenses of birth, of food, of shelter, of clothing, of medicines, of 
instruction and of nurture. Also recoverable is the value of the child as a member 
14
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Since the Massachusetts wrongful death statute utilizes a culpability 
standard for the determination of damages, no unique and difficult 
problems arise in Massachusetts in the wrongful death of an infant. 
This is perhaps best illustrated by a recent Massachusetts decision, 
Torigian v. Watertown News CO.23 In the Torigian case, the Supreme 
Judicial Court held that the Massachusetts wrongful death statute was 
applicable to the situation where a child died two and one-half hours 
after her birth from injuries received two months earlier while the 
child was a nonviable fetus in her mother's womb. This is the first 
time that the Supreme Judicial Court has decided that recovery could 
be had for a prenatal injury which occurred prior to viability.24 Had 
the Massachusetts wrongful death statute been compensatory in nature, 
an extremely difficult problem in the ascertainment of damages would 
have been presented to the Court in the Torigian case. What would 
be the pecuniary loss to the parents resulting from the death of their 
infant apart from burial expenses?25 
The fact that the Massachusetts wrongful death statute provides an 
easy solution to the damages problem in a case involving the death 
of a child should not obscure the fact that recovery under a wrongful 
death statute should be based upon loss to the survivors and not upon 
the degree of culpability of the defendant's act. It is patently absurd 
to allow as death damages to the widow and children of a wage-earner, 
upon whose earnings they were dependent for their support, the same 
or a lesser amount than that received by parents for the death of a 
young child. 
§6.7. Excessive and inadequate damages. When a jury returns a 
of the family, that is, the value of the society and companionship of the child to 
the family. 
231967 Mass. Adv. Sh. 735, 225 N.E.2d 926, also noted in §3.10 supra. 
24 In 1884 in the case of Dietrich v. Inhabitants of Northampton, 138 Mass. 14, 
the Supreme Judicial Court formulated the rule that there could be no recovery to 
a child or a child's administrator for prenatal injuries. The rule was unchanged in 
Massachusetts until 1960 when the Court, in the case of Keyes v. Construction Ser-
vice Inc., 340 Mass. 633, 165 N.E.2d 912, held that recovery could be had for pre-
natal injuries provided that the injury occurred after the child had become viable 
and the child was born alive. For a discussion of the Keyes case see 1960 Ann. 
Surv. Mass. Law §3.1. 
25 In a recent New Jersey decision, Graf v. Taggert, 43 N.J. 303, 204 A.2d 140 
(1964), the court held that no recovery could be had for prenatal injuries resulting 
in the death of the child when the child was stillborn. The mother was seven 
months pregnant when the accident occurred. The court based its decision upon 
the fact that there could be no evidence from which to infer pecuniary loss to the 
surviving beneficiaries. 
The Supreme Judicial Court in the Torigian case does not deal with the question 
of whether there may be recovery under the Massachusetts death statute when 
the child dies prior to birth, since the child in the Torigian case lived for two and 
one half hours after birth. Logically, since the Massachusetts statute is punitive in 
nature, it should make no difference whether the child is stillborn or lives several 
hours after birth. It may, however, be necessary to draw the line somewhere, even 
if arbitrarily. 
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verdict in a civil case which is either excessive or inadequate, the trial 
judge may, upon a written motion, set aside the verdict and order a 
new trial.1 Prior to ordering a new trial, however, the judge must 
determine whether the verdict may be corrected by the proper use of 
remittitur or additur and whether the appropriate party is willing to 
remit or accept an addition to the verdict. The standard for the trial 
judge in this situation is set out in General Laws, Chapter 231, Section 
127, in the following language: 
A verdict shall not be set aside as excessive until the prevailing 
party has first been given an opportunity to remit so much thereof 
as the court adjudges is excessive. A verdict shall not be set aside 
solely on the ground that the damages are inadequate until the 
defendant has first been given an opportunity to accept an addi-
tion to the verdict of such amount as the court adjudges reason-
able. 
Prior to a 1967 amendment, the additur could be used only with the 
consent of both the plaintiff and the defendant. Chapter 139 of the 
Acts of 1967 struck out the word "parties" and substituted the word 
"defendant." Presumably this 1967 amendment was based upon the 
premise that it was unfair to require only the approval of the plain-
tiff for a remittitur but require the consent of both parties for an 
additur.2 Actually the pre-1967 statutory provision was unnecessary. It 
made the additur little more than a settlement.3 On the other hand, 
the 1967 amendment could create some difficulties. 
The distinction made prior to the 1967 amendment between the 
remittitur (requiring the consent of only one party) and the additur 
(requiring the consent of both parties) was not entirely arbitrary or 
groundless. When the damages are excessive there is no doubt that all 
the members of the jury are fully convinced on the issue of the de-
fendant's liability. Except where the magnitude of the excessiveness 
of the damages indicates a passion or prejudice which may well have 
permeated the liability issue,4 the mistake on the part of the jury re-
lates only to the damage issue. Thus, in the case of excessive damages 
it is not unfair to the defendant that the plaintiff be given the op-
portunity to avoid a new trial by remitting the damages which are 
excessive. On the other hand, when the damages are clearly inade-
quate, there is a strong possibility that there was a compromise verdict. 
§6.7. 1 G.L., c. 231, §127. 
2 See Hennessey, Procedure and Evidence - Suggestions for Change, 50 Mass. 
L.Q. 329, 331 (1965). 
3 See, however, Clark v. Henshaw Motor Co., 246 Mass. 386, 140 N.E. 593 (1923), 
wherein the Supreme Judicial Court upheld the refusal of the trial judge to grant a 
new trial after the defendant had filed a stipulation increasing the contract dam-
ages from one dollar to fifty-one dollars. The consent of the plaintiff was not ob-
tained. 
4 See Minneapolis, St. P. &: S. Ste. M. Ry. v. Moquin, 283 U.S. 520, 521-522 (1931). 
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When there has been a compromise verdict no one can say with rea-
sonable certainty which way the jury would have found on the issue 
of liability had it not reached a compromise. In this situation it seems 
unfair to give the defendant the sole option of preventing a new trial 
by agreeing to add some amount to the verdict.5 
There is involved in this situation not merely the question of un-
fairness, but also the question of whether the denial of the plaintiff's 
motion for a new trial, conditioned upon the defendant's agreeing to 
increase the amount of the verdict, denies the plaintiff his right to a 
jury trial under the Massachusetts Constitution6 with respect to the 
damages claimed by him. In 1935, in the case of Dimick v. Schiedt,7 
the United States Supreme Court held that the use of the additur de-
prived the plaintiff of his right to a jury trial under the Seventh 
Amendment to the United States Constitution. The Court dis-
tinguished the remittitur in the following language: 
Where the verdict is excessive, the practice of substituting a remis-
sion of the excess for a new trial is not without plausible support 
in the view that what remains is includued in the verdict along 
with the unlawful excess - in that sense that it has been found 
by the jury - and the remittitur has the effect of merely lopping 
off an excrescence. But where the verdict is too small, an increase 
by the court is a bald addition of something which in no sense can 
be said to be included in the vedict.8 
The decision of the United States Supreme Court in the Dimick 
case is not binding in the state courts because the states are not bound 
by the provisions of the Seventh Amendment, either directly9 or by 
reason of incorporation into the due process clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment.1o The reasoning of the Dimick case, however, may well be 
applicable to an argument that the additur violates the plaintiff's right 
5 A parallel may be drawn from the Massachusetts decision, Simmons v. Fish, 
210 Mass. 563, 97 N.E. 102 (1912). In the Simmons case the plaintiff received a 
verdict of $200 for the loss of an eye. The trial judge, agreeing that the damages 
were inadequate, ordered a new trial limited to the issue of damages. The defen-
dant argued that the amount of the damages awarded indicated a compromise 
verdict and was in effect a finding for the defendant on the issue of liability. The 
Supreme Judicial Court held that it would be a gross injustice to set aside such a 
verdict as to damages alone against the protest of a defendant, and force him to a 
new trial with the issue of liability closed against him when it appears obvious 
that no jury had ever decided that issue against him on justifiable grounds. 
6 Mass. Const., part I, art. XV, provides in part: "[I]n all suits between two or 
more persons, except in cases in which it has heretofore been otherways used and 
practised, the parties have a right to a trial by jury; and this method of procedure 
shall be held sacred. . . ." 
7 293 U.S. 474 (1935). 
8Id. at 486. 
9 Pearson v. Yewdall, 95 U.S. 294 (1877). 
10 Walker v. Sauvinet, 92 U.S. 90 (1875); Malloy v. Hogan, !l78 U.S. I, 4 n.2 
(1964) (dictum). 
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to a jury trial under the Massachusetts Constitution,u particularly 
where the verdict appears to have been a compromise verdict.12 
11 While it is true that the Massachusetts Constitution does not use the precise 
language of the Seventh Amendment to the United States Constitution, the varia-
tion of language would not seem to warrant a different result. Such was the holding 
in the California decision, Dorsey v. Barba, 38 Cal. 2d 350, 357, 240 P.2d 604, 608 
(1952): "The reasoning of the Dimick case, however, is applicable here since both 
the state and federal Constitutions adopted the existing rules of common law with 
regard to trial by jury, and the variation in language does not warrant a different 
interpretation of the state Constitution." ' 
12 It may be that a trial judge would not use the additur if he believed that the 
inadequate verdict was a compromise verdict. The language of G.L., c. 231, §27, as 
amended by Acts of 1967, c. 139, is as follows: "A verdict shall not be set aside 
solely on the ground that the damages are inadequate until the defendant has 
first been given the opportunity to accept an addition to the verdict as the court 
adjudges reasonable," On the other hand, unless the amount of the damages 
awarded indicated a mistake by the jury in applying the judge's instructions, how 
would one know whether the inadequacy of the award was due to a compromise 
verdict? 
18
Annual Survey of Massachusetts Law, Vol. 1967 [1967], Art. 9
http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/asml/vol1967/iss1/9
